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Abstract. This paper investigates the equivalence of tariffs and quotas when the market
in question is imperfectly competitive and open to direct foreign investment. The
absence of a foreign supply response under a quota, so critical to the analysis of the
differential impact of tariffs and quotas under imperfect competition, is called into
question by the potential occurrence of direct foreign investment. The paper proves the
equivalence of optimal tariffs and quotas when the markets are oligopolistic and open to
direct foreign investment.
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The equivalence of tariffs and quotas in a perfectly competitive world is well understood. It is by
now equally well known that the presence of a monopoly may destroy the tariff-quota equivalence.
While these are informative limiting cases, much international trade is conducted in markets that
lie somewhere between the extremes of pure competition and monopoly. This trade is often char-
acterized by large, frequently multinational, players who recognize their influence on markets and
hence act strategically. Recent developments in trade theory have explored how trade policy works
in this setting. This work is nicely surveyed in Grossman and Richardson (1985).
Most of the recent work on trade policy with imperfect competition has looked at various tariff-
subsidy schemes. By concentrating on prices, as opposed to quantities, as policy instruments,
researchers have made an important choice. While under perfect competition there will be an
equivalent quota associated with any tariff, under imperfect competition this need not be the case.
Bhagwati (1965) first noted this point. He showed that a tariff might dominate a quota or vice versa
depending on the basis for comparison (same imports or same total consumption) and on where
the monopoly was located. While the existence of a competitive fringe is an essential element of
Bhagwati's model,1 the asymmetric foreign supply response to a tariff and a quota is at the heart
of the nonequivalence result. Under a tariff, the foreign producer can still increase output while
under a binding quota, it cannot.
Krishna (1983) was among the first to investigate quotas in an oligopoly setting. Her analysis
provided yet another example of nonequivalence between tariffs and quotas. Using a game theoretic
framework in which firms played strategically against other firms but took government actions as
given, Krishna showed that a quota might serve as a facilitating device while a tariff would not.
She demonstrates that in a Bertrand duopoly setting, each firm would like to raise its price if it
This paper is based on my Ph.D. dissertation at Princeton University. I have benefitted from the insightful
comments and suggestions of Avinash Dixit and Gene Grossman to whom I am grateful.
1 If a monopolist does not face a fringe of competitive suppliers, tariffs and quotas will be equivalent. That is, if
the monopolist is a world, as opposed to domestic, monopolist, Bhagwati's result does not hold.
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were sure that its rival would do likewise. Under a quota; it is irrational for a firm to lower its
price in order to gain market share since quotas would bind. Quotas, then, allow firms to credibly
precommit to higher prices. Like Bhagwati's results, Krishna's exploit the lack of a foreign supply
response imposed by a quota but not by a tariff. 2
In Krishna's introduction, she writes:
Most of the literature has dealt with the two polar cases of monopoly and perfect compe-
tition, neglecting the strategic interaction crucial to the analysis of oligopoly. Such interac-
tion between firms is a dominant feature of many markets, especially in some international
markets in which large multinationals operate.
Her work, though, like much of the analysis of tax based policies, ignores the possible multina-
tional aspects of the game firms play. In this paper, I consider the tariff quota equivalence question
in a setting which explicitly accounts for the possibility of direct foreign investment (dfi).
The absence of a foreign supply response under a quota, so critical to the analysis of the
differential impact of tariffs and quotas under imperfect competition is called into question by the
potential occurrence of dfi. The credible precommitment permitted by a government imposed quota
is crucial to Krishna's analysis. Yet when the possibility of dfi exists, the key assumption of no
foreign supply response to a quota may no longer hold. While a foreign producer may not be able
to increase local exportable output under a binding quota, the firm may produce the additional
output in the home country. In this case, a quota is no longer a facilitating device, and many of
the strategic interactions that differentiate a quota from a tariff disappear.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a diagrammatic analysis of
tariff-quota comparisons in the presence of dfi. This section provides a useful taxonomy for the
general model of Section 3. Section 2 also provides some intuition about the results of Section 3. In
that section, a general oligopoly model with dfi is developed. The generality extends to the number
of firms and their mode of conduct. In this setting, the tariff-quota nonequivalence of Bhagwati
and Krishna is reconsidered. In particular, the optimal profit-shifting tariff is compared to the
optimal profit-shifting quota. Section 4 entertains the notion that trade policy might be motivated
by considerations of domestic employment. Allowing this to be the case, equivalence results are
re-examined. Section 5 relaxes assumptions about firms' cost functions and reconsiders the results
of Section 3. A brief summary is given in Section 6.
2 Sweeney (1985) recently studied tariffs and quotas in a conjectural variations oligopolistic setting. He noted
that quotas in effect change a firm's conjectures in a way that tariffs do not. This is because the rational firm's
conjectures will be conditioned on the type of policies its competitors face. While there are problems in trying to
model a sequential and hence dynamic process using conjectural variations, the underlying idea of the CV approach
is the same as Bhagwati's and Krishna's. That is) there is no foreign supply response to a binding quota while such
a response exists for a tariff.
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2. A Diagrammatic Analysis of Tariff Quota Comparisons.
Consider a market in which a foreign monopolist is the sole supplier of a good in the home-
country market.3 Figure 1 represents the market for the foreign good in the usual space of own
price and quantity. The foreign monopolist faces the demand schedule D and the corresponding
marginal revenue schedule MR.
In Figure 1, it is well known that the optimal tariff is positive, as the home country can improve
its welfare by extracting monopoly rents from the foreign country in excess of the lost consumer
surplus. ' This result requires only that MR be more steeply sloped than the linear D. It is
noteworthy that some positive tariffs are welfare improving. Since it is rational to impose such a
tariff, (non)equivalence results are meaningful in a way they might not be if the imposition of a
tariff was itself economically irrational. For example, the equivalence of tariffs and quotas in the
perfectly competitive paradigm begs the question of why the tariff or quota is present in the first
place.
Initially, the foreign firm produces only in the foreign country (this will be referred to as domestic
production) at constant marginal cost MC dom. The assumption of constant marginal cost is not
incidental. While it simplifies the analysis, it is also the logical choice. If marginal cost were
increasing, one might ask why additional plants, foreign or domestic, do not already exist. (This
analysis, like its predecessors, glosses over the implications of large fixed costs.) If marginal costs
were decreasing, a new set of issues for strategic trade policy arises.5
Now let us introduce the possibility of dfi by the foreign firm in the home country. Dfi production
is assumed to be a perfect substitute for non-dfi production. For example, the consumer is assumed
to be indifferent between a Honda Accord built in Ohio and the same model manufactured in Japan.
The marginal cost of production under dfi, MC di, also is assumed to be constant. MC dfi must
be at least as high as MC"dom. If this were not the case, cost minimization would preclude any
domestic production. The optimal rent- extracting tariff may be either at least as large as or smaller
than the difference in marginal costs. I compare tariffs and quotas for each case.
3 As stated in note 1, the optimal tariff and optimal quota are equivalent in this case when dfi is not possible, since
there is no competitive fringe and the monopolist is a global, as opposed to domestic, monopolist. Nevertheless, this
framework provides a very useful taxonomy for the more general oligopoly model of Section 3.
4 This result and related others have been demonstrated in a series of papers by Brander and Spencer.
5 Krugman(1984) has shown that with increasing returns to scale, an advantage given to a frirn in one market via
trade or industrial policy may spill over into advantages in another market. Introducing direct froeign investment
into this scenario is an interesting problem, but it obscures the more basic issues this paper addresses.
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With inverse demand represented by p = a - bx and the constant marginal cost by c, the optimal
rent seeking tariff absent the possibility of dfi is given by j. The calculations for this linear case
are given in Appendix A. This tariff and the difference between MC dfi and MCd"m are exogenous
to the policymaker. Whether or not the optimal tariff is greater than the difference in marginal
costs is a function only of tastes and technologies. 6
Case 1: The optimal tariff, neglecting the possibility of dfi is at least as large as the difference
in marginal costs. This corresponds to a quota of at most Q*. This case is given in the figure by a
tariff equal to EH. In the absence of dfi, the quota yielding the same level of imports is given by Q.
Now introduce the possibility of dfi at MC df.i Dfi constrains the optimal tariff to a level of AP. ?
Any larger tariff induces dfi and no revenue is raised. Some semantic clarification is useful. A tariff
of EH which was optimal before the possibility of dfi is termed the no-dfi optimal tariff. The tariff
which is optimal after dfi is introduced is termed the cum-dfi optimal tariff.
There is no cum-dfi tariff which will ensure imports of Q while a quota does just that. While this
is an obvious nonequivalence, it is not a very meaningful one, since a quota of Q in the presence
of dfi is not optimal. At a quota of Q, the foreign producer faces a kinked MC schedule given
by AEKLS. Quota licence revenue is given by APKE. While imports equal Q, the amount KL
is produced as dfi in the home country. Total consumption of the good is Q-. Home welfare is
given by consumer surplus and licence revenue. This is area MNR plus PKEA. A quota of QM,
which corresponds to the cum-dfi optimal tariff, yields the same consumer surplus but gives strictly
greater licence revenue by amount KLRE. The cum-dfi optimal tariff is equivalent to the cum-dfi
optimal quota.
Simple jumping of a quota such as Q leads to dfi concurrent with home production even though
marginal costs are constant. Without quantity restrictions, such behavior is incompatible with
standard cost minimization. Seen from a different angle, the very presence of dfi as quota jumping
is evidence that the quota is set at a suboptimal level.
With imperfect competition, dfi may be welfare worsening, as it may undermine optimal rent
extracting trade policies. 8 This may be seen in figure 1. Without dfi and an optimal tariff equal
to EH, welfare is given by tariff revenue ZHEA plus consumer surplus RGF. With dfi, the optimal
6 As section 3 will prive, the linearity of this example is not necessary to the argument presented here. Even in a
general model, the optimal policies will be functions of only tastes and technology.
SActually, the optimal tariff is constrained to a level of AP minus epsilon. Throughouit the analysis, the open set
aspect of the optimal tariff will be ignored.
8 A similar point has been made in a perfectly competitive model by Grossman(1984).
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tariff yields revenue PLRA and consumer surplus RNM. If area ZHKP is greater than areas KLRE
plus GFMN, dfi has been welfare worsening. For a quota set at Q, the relevant comparison is
GFMN versus ZHKP. If the former is smaller, dfi is again welfare worsening. Although it is not
obvious from the geometry, a revealed-preference argument shows that dfi is welfare worsening since
the cum- dfi policies were feasible but not chosen when selecting the no-dfi optimal policies.
Case 2: The optimal tariff is less than the difference in marginal costs.
For quantity setting, this corresponds to an optimal quota of between Q and Q*. In this case
the usual tariff-quota nonequivalence results hold except that the marginal cost of dfi imposes an
upper bound beyond which a quota will provoke a supply response in the form of dfi. If the cost
function of dfi is similar to the cost function of domestic production, the difference in marginal
costs will be small and it becomes less likely that case 2 will obtain.
3. A More General Analysis of Tariff-Quota Comparisons.
The previous section demonstrated that in a fairly specific setting, if the no-dfi optimal tariff
exceeded the difference in local and dfi marginal costs, then the introduction of dfi made the
optimal rent-extracting tariff and the optimal rent-extracting quota equivalent policies. In section
2, there was a foreign monopolist facing a linear demand schedule. In this section, I generalize the
diagrammatic results by considering a differentiated-product oligopoly in which firms face general
demand schedules and market conduct is not restricted. This latter generalization is of some
significance, as Eaton and Grossman (1986) have shown that choice of market conduct is often key
to characterizing optimal policies.
I consider tariff-quota equivalence in the presence of dfi when firms compete only in the home
market. The restrictive assumption that is in part carried over from Section 2 is that marginal
costs must be constant in the neighborhood where production actually occurs. The reasons are the
same as before. With upward sloping marginal costs, one must consider why another plant does
not already exist. (The ramifications of upward sloping marginal costs are discussed in Section 5.)
With downward sloping marginal costs, an entirely new set of issues arises and these may obscure
the original intent of the analysis.
The more general setting described above is of more than just theoretical interest as it describes
the U.S./Japanese automobile market fairly accurately. U.S. and Japanese cars are certainly dif-
ferentiated products. They are produced with constant marginal costs by a small number of very
large firms in each country. These firms compete almost solely in the U.S. market. Furthermore,
the market has been subject to tariffs and, more recently, quotas. Completing the picture, dfi in
the U.S. by Japanese firms is a rapidly growing phenornenon.
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The Set Up:
It is useful to establish some notation at the outset. Let:
ni = number of domestic firms.
n2= number of foreign firms.
I consider a symmetric market structure in which firms within a country are identical. Dfi
production represents an increase in output but it is not an increase in the number of firms.
Output is given by:
gi = output of a firm in industry 1.
Q2 = output of a firm in industry 2.




Q2d= n2q2 dand Q2f+ Q2d= Q2
Cost functions are:
C 1 = c(q1 )
C 2 = c(q2d,q2f)
Assumption 1: Marginal costs, denoted c1, c2 f, and c2d, are constant and c2f1> c2d.
Let vij be firm j's conjecture of firm i's response to a change in its own quantity (i,j = 1,2).
The conjectural variations (CV) parameter is used in this context as a flexible parameter which
can represent myriad market conducts. It is no more than a convenient parameterization.
The home country's utility function is given by: U = U(Q 1 , Q2) Inverse demands are:
U l P'(Q 1 , Q 2 ) and 1 = P2
BQi BQ2
Subscripts on P1 and P 2 will denote partial derivatives.
Before dfi is introduced, the home country is able to freely set a specific tariff t on imports and
a specific subsidy s on home production. The optimal policies for this standard no-dfi case are
derived in Appendix B. Finally, I make the following two assumptions.
Assumption 2: The no-dfi optimal tariff is profitably jumped. (This corresponds to Case 1 of
the diagrammatic analysis.)
Assumption 3: Home welfare is continuous and strictly concave in quantities.
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Proof of Tariff Quota Equivalence:
I prove that the optimal tariff and quota are equivalent in two steps. In step 1, I characterize
the optimal tariff and subsidy combination. It is important to consider subsidy schemes. Because
the no-dfi optimal tariff is, by assumption 2, profitably jumped, the no-dfi optimal tariff raises no
revenue. In this sense, dfi constrains tariff setting to a level no greater than the difference in foreign
marginal costs. With two quantities involved, Qi and Q2 , a first best solution will usually require
two unconstrained policy policy tools. As the cum-dfi optimal tariff is exogenously constrained,
the subsidy may capture some of the foreign oligopoly rents that an unconstrained optimal tariff
would have captured. The approach here follows Dixit (1983 and 1984).
In step 2, I characterize the optimal quota and subsidy combination. Dfi does not constrain
quota setting as it constrains the optimal tariff. Hence the home country has an unconstrained
policy tool for each quantity involved. I prove that the ability to set a binding quota has no value
in terms of home country welfare. Furthermore, the solution to the optimal tariff/subsidy scheme
will always be the solution to the optimal quota/subsidy scheme. This equivalence will be shown
to be independent of the number of firms on either side of the market and independent of the mode
of market conduct.
Appendix C extends the equivalence by proving that the optimal tariff and quota are equivalent
when no subsidy is available. This result requires an assumption slightly stronger than Assumption
3.
Step 1. Here I characterize the optimal tariff subsidy scheme. Firms choose outputs strategically
but take government policies as given. The government maximizes national welfare conditional on
firms' profit maximization.
I first consider firms' profit maximizing behavior. By assumption 2, the curn-dfi optimal tariff
must be no greater than c 21 -c 2 d. (Were it greater, no revenue would be raised.) Because marginal
costs are constant by assumption 1, cost minimization precludes dfi concurrent with domestic
production. Thus q2 = Q2d.
Firms' profit functions are given by:
ir1 = P
1 (Q1, Q2 )g1 - C
1 (q1)+ sq1 (1)
72 = (P 2 (Q 1 , Q 2 ) - t)q 2 - C2(q2) (2)
An interior solution to an individual firm's profit maximization implies:
=l- -0 = P1 (Qi,Q2 ) +s - ci +qi(Pf'(Qi,Q 2 )go+ P2 (Q1 ,Q2 )g1) (3)
691
7
= 67r2  2F~1'I~-p2 _b = 0 = P2(Q1i, Q2) - t - c2 d + g2 (P1(Q1,0 )i+P20,Q)o 4-g=2 Q''' p 2 fl l + D2 (f1 Q)l\L\(4)
where: go = [1 + (n 1 - 1)v11]
gi r 2 v 2 1
ho = [1 + (n2 - 1)v22]
hi = n1 v1 2
These g and h terms reflect the mode of market conduct and the number of firms. They are treated
as constants although making them functions of quantities does not affect any of the equivalence
results.
Some comparative statics analysis on firms' profit maximization will be useful for the later
welfare analysis. It will be helpful to introduce some new notation. Arguments of partial derivatives
of the inverse demand functions will be omitted for brevity. Let:
21h1+ Piho P 290+ P2291
1(Q1, Q2) = P-11 +P 2  0  3(Q1,Q2) =
n2 l1
P12h 1 +P 2 0ho P 190+P 12 9102(Q1,Q2) = 04(Q1,Q2)=
n2 nl
This set of terms is related to the degree of concavity or convexity of the inverse demand functions.
With linear inverse demands, these terms all become zero. A second set of terms deals with
conjectures aggregated to an industry level. These terms are:
=Pigo+ P2i1 Ph+PhoR1(Q1,Q 2)= P and R2 (Q1 ,Q2) -
1 n2
Using this notation, firms' first order conditions simplify to:
Pl + Q1R1 - ci = -s (3')
P2 +Q 2R2 -c2d=t (4')
Conditional on assumption 2, equations (3') and (4') implicitly define a one to one mapping
between policy tools s and t and quantities Q1 and Q2. As policy tools change, firms respond by
adjusting quantities. This relationship is given by totally differentiating (3') and (4') to give the
below system:
P?±+Q2 2 1 P + R2±+Q2 2 dQ2 ) di (5)
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Conditional on assumptions 1 through 3 and firms' profit maximization, the home country sets
s and t to maximize home welfare. Home welfare is given by consumer surplus, domestic profits,
and net trade taxes. Hence:
W = U(Q 1, Q2) - P1Q 1 - P
2Q2 + n1 7r1 +tQ 2 - sQ1
= U(Q 1, Q 2) - P
2(Q1 ,Q 2 )Q 2 - c1Q 1 +tQ2  (6)
This implicitly defines welfare as a function of s and t. That is:
W = f(Qi(s,t),Q2(s,t),t) (7)
I proceed by characterizing the optimal policy pair(s*, t *). The home production subsidy is not
constrained by the potential of dfi. Hence, s is set such that
SW
= 0 for any tariff t (8)
The tariff, though, is constrained in that any tariff greater than the difference in marginal costs
induces dfi and hence raises no revenue.
Lermrrta 1: The optimal cum-dfi tariff is the largest tariff that does not induce dfi. Hence
t* = C2 -c2.
Proof: See Appendix D.
Equation (8) implicitly defines the optimal subsidy coupled with the cum- dfi optimal tariff.
Using t = c2 f -C2d and substituting (3') into (8) yields:
SW 6Q Q2= 0= [-s - Q1R1 - PQ 2] s+ [c 2 1Q-Qc2d- PQ 2 ]-.
Using system (5) to solve for and 9 and solving for s gives:
an Q n ovn o i e:6's 2 [c2f - c2 - Q2Pf][Pf + Q2 12i]s = -Q1R1 -Q2P1P(9)
PS + R2 + Q2Q2
The optimal subsidy is a function of market conduct, number of firms, tastes, and technology. It




6(c2 f -c2d) P2 + R2
This accords with intuition. As the difference in marginal costs contracts, the cum-dfi optimal
tariff becornes more constrained. Since the profit shifting ability of the tariff is more constrained,
the home production subsidy acts to capture some of the foreign oligopoly rents that the tariff no
longer can.
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Step 2. I next characterize the optimal quota/subsidy scheme and show that it is equivalent to
the optimal tariff/subsidy scheme of step 1.
The home government may set two policy tools-a quota on Q2 d and a subsidy on home produc-
tion. As in the tariff/subsidy scheme, I assume c2 f - C2 d is greater than the no-dfi optimal tariff.
The dual of this this assumption is that dfi, if it existed, would occur at the no-dfi optimal quota.
Unlike the case of the tariff, the difference in foreign marginal costs does not constrain the choice
of the quota. This corresponds to the diagrammatic case in which no tariff could ensure imports
of Q while a quota did just that. The cost differential, C2f - C2 d, now sets the maximum price a
foreign firm would be willing to pay for a quota licence. So that comparison with the tariff/subsidy
scenario is valid, I assume quotas are auctioned to foreign producers.
As in step 1, I first consider firms' profit maximization and then characterize optimal policy
conditional on firms' optimizing behavior. Since foreign firms pay c2 f - c2 d for the quota licence
on non-dfi production, a foreign firm's profit function is now given by:9
7r2 = [P 2 (Q1 , Q 2 ) - (c2f-c2d)]q2d+P 2 (Q1,Q2)q2f -C 2 (2d,q2 f) (10)
A home firm's profit function is unchanged from (1) as is its first order condition-(3) or (3').
The foreign firms maximize profits only with respect to Q2 f. They take Q2 d as given since the
quota binds and is exogenously set. Foreign profit maximization, then, implies:
67r2 =0=P
2 -c 2 + g.2 Pho+ Pho] and q2d=0 ]-q2f (11)
692 j
=P2 - C2 + (Q 2 1f+Q 2 d)R 2  (11')
Equations (3') and (11') implicitly define a mapping between policy tools s and Q2d and free
quantities Q1 and Q2 f. As the government changes policies, quantities adjust. For foreign firms,
this relationship is represented by totally differentiating (11'). This gives:
[P1 +(Q2 f +Q2d)11]dQ1 +[P2 +(Q2f+Q2d)Q2 + R 2 ][dQ 2 f +dQ2 d] = 0 (12)
As quantities change, P2 changes. Since dP2 (Q1,Q 2 ) = pidQ1 + P2dQ2 , (12)can be written:
dP2 = (-Q 2 1)dQ1 - (Q21 2 + R 2)dQ 2  (13)
9 It is well known that an equilibrium in pure strategies may not exist for Bertrand behavior in the presence of a
quota. Krishna then shows an equilibrium will exist in mixed strategies. Non-existence of equilibria in pure strategies
is not a problem when dfi occArs. To understand why, it helps to understand why a pure strageties equilibrium in the
presence of a quota might fail to exist in the first place. A binding quota acts like a binding capacity constraint. Firms
playing Nash in prices may cycle endlessly around the capacity constraint or qaota. Introducing dfi is analogous to
removing the capacity constraint that is causing the cycling behavoir. An equilibriurn in pure strategies will exist
when the the quota is jumped via dfi.
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Finally, (12) can be manipulated to show how free quantities change as the quota is adjusted.
This gives:
dQ~d= P12 + Q2201dQPlQ 2 1--dQdQ2f (14)Qd P22 + Q2SZ2 + R2d1 d~
Equations (13) and (14) will be useful for the home welfare maximization to which I now turn.
Home welfare is given by consumer surplus, domestic profits, and lisence revenues.
W = U(Qi, Q 2 ) - P
1Q 1 - P
2 Q 2 + m1r1 + (c2 f - c2 d)Q2d - sQi (15)
Unlike the tariff case, revenue is possible in the presence of dfi, hence Q2f need not equal zero. An
incremental change in welfare is given by:
dW = (P1 - ci)dQi - (Q2f - Q2 d)dP2 +(c 2 1 - C2d)dQ2d (16)
Equation (16) implies a possible first best situation since there is an unconstrained policy tool for
each of the free quantities-Qi and Q2f.
Substituting (3'), (13) and (14) into the welfare maximand, (16) and simplifying gives:
dW = (-Q 1R1 - s+ (Q2 )
2
1-[(Q 2 )
2Q 2 + Q2R2 + c2f -c2d] 2 P1 + Q271 dP2 +Q 2 02+R 2
+(c2d - c2)dQ2f (17)
The second term in (17) is very informative. Since c2 f > c2d, dfi enters negatively in home
welfare. The ability to set a strictly binding quota which provokes dfi, then, is of no benefit to
domestic welfare. At a welfare optimum,Q 2 f equals 0. The quota on Q2d is set such that revenue
Q2 d(c2 -c 2 d) is collected but no dfi is provoked. 10 This is exactly what the cum-dfi optimal tariff
accomplishes.
The first term in (17) implicitly defines the optimal subsidy that is coupled with the optimal
quota. Setting the term multiplied by dQ1 equal to zero and solving for s gives the optimal subsidy.
Straightforward calculations show that this optimal subsidy is identical to the optimal subsidy in
the tariff/subsidy scheme of step 1. Again, the optimal subsidy depends on the number of domestic
and foreign firms and their mode of market conduct.
The tariff/subsidy scheme is completely equivalent to the quota/subsidy scheme. This result is
independent of the number of firms, their market conduct, and the inverse demand system they
face.
10 Proof that this assignment does indeed achive the optirnum is analogous to Lernma 1. We know difi enters welfare
negatively, yet licence revenue, like the constrained tariff revenue, enters welfare positively. Hence, the optimum is
at the knife-edge described in the text. It is not possible to set i and 9 = 0 to explicitly solve for the optimual
quota because price is a general function of quantities.
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4. Domestic Employment Considerations and Tariff-Quota Equivalence.
Section 3 showed that the existence of dfi in a constant marginal cost imperfectly competitive
industry is evidence of suboptimal trade policy. Dfi, though, is often praised for the increased
employment associated with it. I ask in this section how the equivalence results of section 3 are
affected by domestic employment concerns.
I assume the employment associated with production in the home country (Qi + Q2 j) enters
national welfare but does not directly enter firms' profit functions. 11 The approach used in this
section is intentionally agnostic as to why this might be the case.12
Let # = 4(Q1 + Q2 f) be a flexible function that measures how society values a dollar of wages
relative to a dollar of trade tax revenue or consumer surplus. 4 is normalized such that # = 1 implies
society is indifferent between a dollar paid in wages and a dollar of consumer surplus. 0 = 0 implies
wages do not enter national welfare. This was the implicit assumption throughout section 3. This
might be a logical choice if there is no involuntary unemployment in the home economy. 4 may be
constant (#' = 0). In this case, the first dollar of wages is just as important as the nth. Similarly, 4
may be concave or convex in employment. One might well imagine that the home country derives
decreasing marginal benefits to increasing employment.
Employment enters national welfare in the following way. 13
benefits to home country employment = 4(Q1 + Q 2 )aw [Q1-+ Q2 f]
where: a = the assumed constant input coefficient on labor.
w = the assumed constant wage. (18)
Firms' first order conditions and comparative statics on them are unchanged since employment
considerations do not enter profit functions. A tariff/subsidy scheme, then, still imposes a bang-
bang solution to the firms' cost minimization problem. While a quota/subsidy scheme does not
11 Employment associated with the production of Q2f enters national welfare in the same way as the employment
associated with the production of Q1. It is unclear why this might not be the case. Nonetheless, the (non-)equivalence
results of this section are unchanged by letting only employment associated with dfi production enter welfare con-
siderations via (18).
12 This apporach is in the spirit of Atkinson's work on modelling attitudes concerning inequality in optimal tax
problems.
13 The modeling approach does not address the possible endogeneity of the employment externality. That is, I do
not account for the idea that the existence of protection may lead to a divregence between the actual and the shadow
wage. Resulting unemployment in this case is endogenously determined with policy. Neglecting this endogeneity
may result in misguided policymaking. See Rodrik (1986) on this issue.
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force this behavior, the optimal quota/subsidy scheme of Section 3 induces it. I next investigate
whether introducing employment concerns into the home welfare function alters this equivalence.
With a quota/subsidy scheme, home welfare is now:
W' =U(Q1, Q2) - P'Q1- P2 Q2+nl7rl+(c2f -c2d)Q2 d-sQl+4(Ql+Q2 f)aw[Q1+Q 2 f] (19)
An incremental change in welfare is given by:
dW = [P1 - c1 +#haw + Q1awcb']dQ1 - Q2 dP
2 + (c2 1 - c2d)dQ2d+ [qaw -+ Q2 fawq']dQ2 f (20)
Using the same substitutions used in step 2 of section 3 yields:
dW = [-Q1R1 -s+ (Q2)201 + Oaw + Qi#'aw - [(Q2)212 + Q2 R 2 + C2 f - C2dJ[ 2  Q20+ ]]dQ1
P 2 + Q2 f2 + R2
+ (c2d- c2f + qdaw + Q2 fq'aw)dQ2f (21)
Tariff- quota equivalence now depends on whether the welfare benefits to employment are con-
stant over the relevant range of output.
Case 1: #' = 0. In this case, tariff/subsidy and quota/subsidy schemes are equivalent. Due to
constant marginal costs, firms either completely jump a tariff or engage in no dfi. Tariff revenue
per unit of Q2d is c2 f -C2d. The welfare benefits to dfi are daw per unit Q2f. If #aw > C2f - C2d,
the home country prefers to collect no tariff revenue and instead induce dfi and its attendant
employment benefits. If #aw < c2f - c2 d , the home country prefers no dfi and instead collects
tariff revenue (c2 f - c2 d)Q2 d. The bang- bang solution hinges on c2f - c2 d[> or <]#aw.
The optimal quota hinges on exactly the same inequality. This is evident by examining the
second term in (21). At 4' = 0, if haw > c2f - c2d,Q2f enters welfare positively and the more
dfi the better. The optimal quota will set Q2d at zero and induce only dfi while raising no licence
revenue. If qaw < c2f - c2 d, dfi enters welfare negatively and it will be optimal to collect licence
revenue but provoke no dfi.
Case 2:q' = 0. In this case, a non-trivial binding quota may be optimal and tariff-quota
equivalence fails to hold. At a welfare optimum,
#aw -C2 f +C2d+ Q2f q'aW = 0. (22)
From (11), we know:
c - p 2
Q2f = -Q2d
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Substituting this into (35) and solving for Q 2 d yields the optimal quota.'4
Q- # c 2 j-P2(Qi,Q 2 ) _ C2f-c2d
4'd -- R2 - 4'w 23
For some specifications of 0, the optimal quota will involve dfi concurrent with foreign production.
This is intuitive when 4 is very concave in employment. The welfare benefits of the first few hours
of employment are very large but diminish quickly as domestically produced output expands. No
dfi in this case may be suboptimal since the foregone welfare benefits for the first bit of extra
employment will be very large relative to the licence revenue collected. All dfi, on the other hand,
may also be suboptimal as the increase in domestic employment will be so large that the marginal
benefits of such employment are negligible. A quota allows the home country to ensure dfi at a
level somewhere between the all or nothing levels imposed by the tariff/subsidy scheme. In this
case, the home welfare associated with an optimal quota will never be less than that associated
with the optimal tariff.
5. Increasing Marginal Costs and Tariff-Quota Nonequivalence: An Example.
Throughout this paper, marginal costs have been assumed to be constant. In this section I show
that this assumption is essential to the general equivalence results. This is done by the use of of
a numerical counterexample. I consider a simple Cournot duopoly. Let firms' cost functions and
marginal costs be given by:
1
TC1=10+-1 (Q1)2  ci=Q12
1
TC2d= 10 + -(Q2d) 2  C2d= Q2d (38)
2
TC 2f=l10+3Q 2 -+1(Q2 f)2 c2f=3+Q 2 1
As in Section 3, the marginal cost schedule of dfi lies strictly above the marginal cost schedule
of foreign local production. Inverse demands are given by:
P1 = 10 - .1Q1 - .05Q2
P2 = 10 - .05Q1 - .1Q2 (39)
It is no longer useful to use the taxonomy of the constant marginal cost case when calculating
optimal policies. Even if the tariff is greater than (c2 1 - c2 d), dfi and foreign local production
14 One should note that for some modes of market conduct, the optimal quota may not be well defined. This is
because the optimal quota may be negative. While it is clear that a negative tax is a subsidy, a negative quota is
somewhat trickier.
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might coexist. Another difference relative to the constant marginal cost case is that the value
of a quota licence will depend on the quantities being produced. In particular, a licence will be
worth the difference in marginal costs at the equilibrium quantities. With these points in mind,
it is straightforward to calculate optimal policy schemes using the same methodology explained in
Section III. Using the cost functions and inverse demands from (38) and (39), resulting equilibria
are given in Table 1.
Table 1 illustrates several points. First, the optimal tariff/subsidy scheme is not equivalent to
the optimal quota/subsidy scheme. This is due to the very different ways a tariff and a quota affect
the foreign firm's profit function. In free trade, the profit maximizing foreign firm will produce
where c2 f(Q2 f) = c2 i(Q2d) at an interior solution. This implies Q2d> Q2f since c2f(-) > c2d(-). A
tariff shifts c2 d upward but the foreign firm continues to produce wherec2 j = c2 d + t. As output
expands past the point at which dfi becomes profitable, the foreign firm minimizes cost by dividing
production between dfi and foreign local production. When a binding quota is in place, the foreign
firm cannot divide output between its two plants. Instead, the firm must on the margin produce
only via dfi. This results in marginal costs that rise more quickly per unit of output. Whereas
with a tariff the foreign firm could in effect spread the increased marginal costs between two plants,
now only one plant may produce output beyond the amount of the quota. This is why in Table
1 the foreign good price is higher and foreign output and profits are lower with the quota than
with the tariff. The lower Q2 associated with a quota yields a larger P' . While this increases
domestic profits, this does not offset the loss in consumer surplus and trade tax revenue relative to
the tariff scheme. Net home welfare is lower with the optimal quota/subsidy than with the optimal
tariff/subsidy.
Second, Table 1 dramatically illustrates the concept of profit shifting trade policy. Foreign
profits fall from 29.2 with free trade to 6.95 with a tariff and 2.35 with a quota. Home welfare in
turn rises from 41.31 to 64.52 with a tariff and to 55.42 with a quota.
The results of Table 1 are a specific example of tariff-quota nonequivalence. They are not a
general comparison of tariffs and quotas with increasing marginal costs. The results of Table 1 are
sensitive to the mode of market conduct and the functional forms used.
6. Summary.
Recent work on tariff-quota nonequivalence under imperfect competition has ignored the possibility
that the firms concerned might be multinational. Introducing the possibility of dfi, which is often
associated with multinational firms, greatly simplifies the tariff quota cornparison. Many of the
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strategic interactions that are difficult to model in a general way disappear when dfi is introduced
into the model.
Section 2 analyzed the equivalence issue in a linear foreign monopoly model. Using a diagram-
matic analysis, optimal tariffs and quotas were shown to be equivalent when the cum-dfi optimal
tariff' exceeded the difference between the marginal cost of dfi production and the marginal cost of
foreign production.
Section 3 extended the equivalence to a general demand system, general market structure, and
general mode of market conduct. The restrictive assumption maintained was that of constant
marginal costs.
Section 4 introduced domestic employment considerations into the general model of section 3.
It was shown that tariff quota equivalence depends on exactly how employment enters the home
country's welfare function.
Section 5 relaxed the assumption of constant marginal costs. A numerical counterexample
proved the equivalence of section 3 breaks down under increasing marginal costs.
There are at least two broad areas for extending the analysis presented in this paper. Recent
empirical work on strategic trade policy by Dixit (1986) and Baldwin and Krugman (1986) has been
restricted to the investigation of price based policies. The results of this paper should facilitate
investigation of quantity based policies when the restrictive assumptions of Section 3 apply. The
results of this paper are applicable to an empirical analysis of the current United States quota on
Japanese automobiles. This is the subject of current research. Finally, this model does not consider
dynamic effects of dfi. In an uncertain world, dfi might pre-empt future protectionist trade policy.
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Appendix A
The optimal tariff in this situation is derived as follows:
Inverse demand is given by: p = a - bz (1A)
Marginal revenue is: a - 2bx (2A)
Marginal cost plus the tariff is: c + t (3A)
Marginal cost including the tariff set
a-c- (
equal to marginal revenue implies: z = 2b(4A)
a-c-t
Substitution of 4A into 1A yields a-p = 2C(5A)
Consumer surplus is given by: (a-c-(6A)
8b
a -c - t
Tariff revenue is: t[ ] (7A)
2b







Standard tariff/subsidy scheme without dfi
Profit functions are given by:
7r1 = P'(Q1, Q 2 )q1 - C(q1) + sq1  (1B)
7r2 = [P 2(Q1,Q 2) - t]q2 - C(q2 ) (2B)
Welfare is
W = U(Q1, Q 2 ) - PQ1 -P
2Q2 +n17r1 +tQ 2 - sQ 1  (3B)
Incremental changes in welfare are:
dW =(P' -c1)dQ1 -Q 2dP
2 +d(tQ 2)
=(P - c1)dQ1 - Q 2d(P2 -t) + tdQ2  (4B)
Profit function first order conditions simplify to:
P2 (Q1,Q 2) = -R 2Q 2 +c 2 +t
1 (5B)
P (Q 1,Q 2 )= - R1Q1-+c 1 - 2
As foreign producers change quantities in response to policy changes,
d(P2 - t) = [-R 2 Q2 - Q2 022]dQ2 - [Q201 ]dQ 1.
Substitution into (4B) gives:
dW = (P1 - c1 + (Q2 )
2 012))dQ1 + (Q2 R2 + (Q2)
2
12 + t)dQ2  (6B)
At an optimum, P1 = ci-(Q2)
2 01 which implies s* = -R1Q1+(Q 2)2 01(from(5B)). Similarly,t* =
-R 2Q 2 -(Q 2 )




For some modes of market conduct, the optimal production subsidy associated with the optimal
cum-dfi tariff or quota will be positive. Subsidizing domestic oligopolists, though, may often be
politically infeasible. In this appendix, I amend Assumption 3. I then prove that restricting the
home production subsidy to zero does not affect the equivalence of the optimal tariff and optimal
quota, as demonstrated in section 3.
Due to the generality of the set-up described in Section 3, Part A, it is not possible to prove
that j > 0 for all dfi-constrained tariffs. When the production subsidy is restricted to zero, there
is no longer a one to one mapping between policy tools and qunatities. Hence, Lemma 1 no longer
applies. In order to impose some structure on the problem, I amend Assumption 3 as follows.
Assumption 3C: Home welfare is strictly concave in policy tools. It follows immediately that
W > 0 for any dfi-constrained tariff. The cum-dfi optimal tariff, then, is c2f - c2 -d. I next show
that the optimal quota is equivalent to this optimal tariff.
Proposition: The ability to set a binding quota which provokes dfi provides no benefit to home
welfare.
Proof: Foreign firms' profit functions and their respective first order conditions are unchanged
by restricting a home production subsidy to zero. Hence, (11'), (12), and (13) still obtain.
A home firm's profit function is now:
7ri = P 1(Qi,Q2 )q1 - C(Qi) (1C)
Its first order condition at an interior solution is given by:
P1 -c 1 +Q 1 R1 =0 (2C)
Home welfare is still given by (15) and an incremental change in it by (16). Substituting (2C),
(13), and (14) into (16) now yields:
QP2+ 21]
dW = [-Q 1R1 + (Q2)
2 01 - [(Q2)22 + Q2 R 2 +C 2 1 -c2(d][P Q]]dQ1
P2+ Q2 2 +R2
+(c2d- c2 1)dQ2 f (3C)
Since c2d < c2f, dfi enters negatively into home welfare even when the subsidy is constrained
to zero. The ability to set a binding quota that provokes dfi confers no welfare benefit to the home
country. Q.E.D.
As was the case in step 2 of Section 3, the quota on Q2d is set such that Q2d(c2J - c2d) is




Proof of Lemma 1
Proof: A sufficient condition for the proposition to hold is apt > 0 for all t such that dfi does
not occur.
I proceed by first characterizing the optimal no-dfi tariff. Stability results ensure that the
optimal tariff yields a local welfare maximum, not minimum. At a tariff set epsilon less than the
optimal no-dfi tariff, then, -i > 0. I next suppose there exists a tariff less than the optimal no-dfi
tariff at which < 0. I show such a tariff violates assumption 3.
It will be useful to define the following terms:
p = ai = P1 + R1 + Q1 i4 (1D)
P2 = bi = P2 + Qi13 (2D)
Similarly,
p 2 = a2 = P22+ R2 + Q212 (3D)
p2 = b2 = P1 + Q201 (4D)
Following Dixit (1984), a natural myopic adjustment process is one in which each firm increases its
output starting at a given point if it perceives positive marginal profit from doing so. Hence:
q, = ipi(Q1, Q2) (5D)
where oa > 0 are adjustment speeds. I have assumed a symmetric industry structure. This
symmetry is also assumed to extend to firms' adjustment paths to equilibrium quantities when
perturbed away from such quantities. In this case, it is sufficient to examine a representative firm
from each industry.
Taking linear approximations around equilibrium quantities (qi,qi) yields,
41 (sia1 s1 bi qi-qi
q2 s2b2 S2a2 q2 - q)
Given the symmetric industry structure assumed above, a sufficient condition for stability is
that the coefficient matrix in (6D) have eigenvalues with negative real parts. This implies the
coefficient matrix must have a negative trace and a positive determinant. If this is to hold for any
adjustment speeds,
ai,a2 K 0, and a1a2 - bib2 > 0. (7D)
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These are the stability conditions. Using them, system (5) can be rewritten as:
(a 1  b1 dQ1  (-ds \
b2 a2 dQ 2  ) dt)(8D)
Implicitly differentiating (7) with respect to t yields:
SW 6W 6Q 1  5W 6Q 2
6t 6Qi 6t 6Q2 6 Q (D
From (6),
SW =P 1 -c 1 -P1PQ 2  and =t-P2Q 2.
6Q1 6Q2
While from (8D),
6Qi bi 6Q2 ai
-- = s - bb and S =as- .
1ta a 2-1bb 2  6 - a1a2 -b 1b2
Substitution of the above into (9D) yields:
SW 1
t [ (P -c1 - P1Q2 )bi + (t - P2 Q 2 )a 2 ]-+ Q2 (10D)
where D = a1a2 - b1b2.
While the tariff is constrained by potential dfi, the subsidy is not. Hence, -W = 0 for all tariffs.
This yields:
SW -=1
-(P -c 1 - P1Q2 )a2 + (t - P2Q2 )b2 ] = 0.
This implies:
P1 -c 1 -PQ 2 =t -P Q2. (11D)
Substitution of (11D) into (10D) and some manipulation yields:
SW 1




The optimal no-dfi tariff is given by:
T n"dfi = -Q 2 R2 - (Q2)21 2.
The second order condition of (12D) is:
62W 1
=-<0.
This ensures that welfare is increasing at a tariff just less than 2*mo**. In figure 2, this is a point
epsilon to the left of point A.
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Suppose that at some tariff less than t** , - < 0. This is a point such as B in figure 2.
Because welfare is continuous in quantities and there is a one to one mapping between quantities
and policy tools, welfare must also be continuous in policy tools. By the continuity of the welfare
function, there must exist a point such as C at which 6N = 0. At all t in figure 2, the subsidy
is optimally set. Hence, at point C, b and -9 = 0. But at point A, - and -t = 0. Because
welfare is, by assumption 3, strictly concave in quantities and there exists a one to one mapping
between quantities and policy tools, there can be only one point at which b and - are jointly
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Table 1
Optimal Tariff/Subsidy and Optimal Quota/Subsidy Schemes
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